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Abstract—Audio splicing is one of the most common ma-
nipulation techniques in the area of audio forensics. In this
paper, the magnitudes of acoustic channel impulse response
and ambient noise are proposed as the environmental signature.
Specifically, the spliced audio segments are detected according
to the magnitude correlation between the query frames and
reference frames via a statically optimal threshold. The detection
accuracy is further refined by comparing the adjacent frames.
The effectiveness of the proposed method is tested on two data
sets. One is generated from TIMIT database, and the other
one is made in four acoustic environments using a commercial
grade microphones. Experimental results show that the proposed
method not only detects the presence of spliced frames, but
also localizes the forgery segments with near perfect accuracy.
Comparison results illustrate that the identification accuracy of
the proposed scheme is higher than the previous schemes. In
addition, experimental results also show that the proposed scheme
is robust to MP3 compression attack, which is also superior to
the previous works.
Index Terms—Audio Forensics, Acoustic Environmental Sig-
nature, Splicing Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGIAL media (audio, video, and image) has becomea dominant evidence in litigation and criminal justice,
as it can be easily obtained by smart phones and carry-on
cameras. Before digital media could be admitted as evidence
in a court of law, its authenticity and integrity must be verified.
However, the availability of powerful, sophisticated, low-cost
and easy-to-use digital media manipulation tools has rendered
the integrity authentication of digital media a challenging
issue. For instance, audio splicing is one of the most popular
and easy-to-do attack, where target audio is assembled by
splicing segments from multiple audio recordings. Thus, in
this context, we are trying to provide authoritative answers to
the following questions, which should be addressed such as
[1]:
• Was the evidentiary recording captured at location, as
claimed?
• Is an evidentiary recording “original” or was it created
by splicing multiple recordings together?
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In our previous works [1]–[4], we have shown that acoustic
reverberation and ambient noise can be used for acoustic envi-
ronment identification. One of the limitations of these methods
is that these methods cannot be used for splicing location
identification. And also, researchers have proposed various
methods for the applications of audio source identification
[5], acquisition device identification [6], double compression
[7] and etc. However, applicability of these method for audio
splicing detection is missing.
This paper presents a novel approach to provide evidence of
the location information of the captured audio. The magnitudes
of acoustic channel impulse response and ambient noise are
used as intrinsic acoustic environment signature for splicing
detection and splicing location identification. The proposed
scheme firstly extracts the magnitudes of channel impulse
response and ambient noise by applying the spectrum classifi-
cation technique to each frame. Then, the correlation between
the magnitudes of the query frame and the reference frame
is calculated. The spliced frames are detected by comparing
the correlation coefficients to the pre-determined threshold. A
refining step using the relationship between adjacent frames is
adopted to reduce the detection errors. One of the advantages
of the proposed approach is that it does not depend on any
assumptions as in [1]. In addition, the proposed method is
robust to lossy compression attack.
Compared with the existing literatures, the contribution of
this paper includes: 1) Environment dependent signatures are
exploited for audio splicing detection; 2) Similarity between
adjacent frames is proposed to reduce the detection and
localization errors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief
overview of the state-of-art audio forensics is provided in
Section II. The audio signal model and the environmental
signature estimation algorithm are introduced in Section III.
Applications of the environmental signature for audio au-
thentication and splicing detection are elaborated in Section
IV. Experimental setup, results, and performance analysis
are provided in Section V. Finally, the conclusion is drawn
in Section VI along with the discussion of future research
directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
The research on audio/speech forensics dates back to the
1960s, when the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation has
conducted an examination of audio recordings for speech
intelligibility enhancement and authentication [8]. In those
days, most forensic experts worked extensively with ana-
log magnetic tape recordings to authenticate the integrity
2of the recording [9], [10] by assessing the analog recorder
fingerprints, such as length of the tape, recording continuity,
head switching transients, mechanical splices, overdubbing
signatures and etc. Authentication becomes more complicated
and challenging for digital recordings as the trace of tampering
is much more difficult to detect than mechanical splices or
overdubbing signatures in the analog tape. Over the past few
decades, several efforts have been initiated to fill the rapidly
growing gap between digital media manipulation technologies
and digital media authentication tools.
For instance, the electric network frequency (ENF)-based
methods [5], [11]–[15] utilize the random fluctuations in
the power-line frequency caused by mismatches between the
electrical system load and generation. This approach can
be extended to recaptured audio recording detection [16]
and geolocation estimation [17]. However, the ENF-based
approaches may not be applicable if well-designed audio
equipment (e.g., professional microphones) or battery-operated
devices (e.g., smartphones) are used to capture the recordings.
Although, the research on the source of ENF in battery-
powered digital recordings is initiated [18], its application in
audio forensics is still untouched.
On the other hand, statistical pattern recognition techniques
were proposed to identify recording locations [19]–[24] and
acquisition devices [6], [25]–[30]. For instance, techniques
based on time/frequency-domain analysis (or mixed domains
analysis) [7], [31]–[33] have been proposed to identify the
trace of double compression attack in MP3 files. A frame-
work based on frequency-domain statistical analysis has also
been proposed by Grigoras [34] to detect traces of audio
(re)compression and to discriminate among different audio
compression algorithms. Similarly, Liu et al. [35] have also
proposed a statistical-learning-based method to detect traces
of double compression. The performance of their method
deteriorates for low-to-high bit rate transcoding. Qiao et al.
[36] address this issue by considering non-zero de-quantized
Modified Discrete Cosine Transform (MDCT) coefficients for
their statistical machine learning method and an improved
scheme has been proposed recently [37]. Brixen in [38] has
proposed a time-domain method based on acoustic reverbera-
tion estimated from digital audio recordings of mobile phone
calls for crime scene identification. Similar schemes using
reverberation time for authentication have been studied by
Malik [2], [39]. However, these methods are limited by their
low accuracy and high complexity in model training and test-
ing. Additionally, their robustness against lossy compression
is unknown. In [1]–[4], [30], [40], model-driven approaches to
estimate acoustic reverberation signatures for automatic acous-
tic environment identification and forgery detection where the
detection accuracy and robustness against MP3 compression
attacks are improved.
Recently, audio splicing detection has attracted a number
of research interests. However, all the above methods were
not primarily designed for audio splicing detection and their
applicability for audio splicing detection is unclear. A method
based on higher-order time-differences and correlation analysis
has been proposed by Cooper [41] to detect traces of “butt-
splicing” in digital recordings. Another audio splicing detec-
tion scheme is based on the analysis of high-order singularity
of wavelet coefficients [42], where singular points detected by
wavelet analysis are classified as forged. Experimental results
show that the best detection rate of this scheme on WAV format
audios is less than 94% and decreases significantly with the
reduction of sampling rate. Pan et al. [43] have proposed a
time-domain method based on higher-order statistics to detect
traces of splicing. The proposed method uses differences of
the local noise levels in an audio signal for splice detection.
It works well on simulated spliced audio, which is generated
by assembling a pure clean audio and a noise audio, however,
its performance in practical applications is unknown. In all
the aforementioned schemes, it is assumed that the raw audio
recording is available, and its performance might degrade
significantly when lossy audio compression algorithm is used.
In this paper, a robust feature, that is, the magnitude of acoustic
impulse response, is proposed for audio splicing detection
and localization. Experimental results demonstrate that the
proposed scheme outperforms the state-of-art works described
above.
III. AUDIO SIGNAL MODELING AND SIGNATURE
ESTIMATION
A. Audio Signal Model
In audio recording, the observed audio/speech will be
contaminated due to the propagation through the acoustic
channel between the speaker and the microphone. The acoustic
channel can be defined as the combined effects of the acoustic
environment, the locations of microphone and the sound
source, the characteristics of the microphone and associated
audio capturing equipment. In this paper, we consider the
model of audio recording system in [1]. For the beginning,
let the s(t), y(t), η(t) be the direct speech signal, digital,
recording and background noise, respectively. The general
model of recording system is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this
paper, we assume that the the microphone noise, ηMic(t),
and transcoding distortion, ηTC(t), are negligible because of
that high quality commercial microphone is used and the
recordings are saved as raw format. One kind of transcoding
distortion (lossy compression distortion) will be considered in
the experiment later. With these assumptions, the model in
Fig. 1 can be simplified as,
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Fig. 1. A simplified digital audio recording system diagram.
3y(t) ≈ hRIR(t) ∗ hMic(t) ∗ s(t) + η(t)
≈ h˙RIR(t) ∗ s(t) + η(t)
(1)
where ∗ represents the convolution operation; hRIR denotes
the Room Impulse Response (RIR) (or Acoustic Channel
Response (ACR)) and h˙RIR(t) = hMic(t) ∗ hRIR(t).
As a remark note that, hRIR(t) is uniquely determined
by the acoustic propagation channel. hMic(t) characterizes
the property of the microphone used to capture the audio.
Compared to hRIR(t), hMic(t) is flatter, less dynamic and
weaker for high quality microphone. It has been proved that
hMic(t) is also useful to authenticate the integrity of audio
[30]. Therefore, we consider the combined effect of hMic(t)
and hRIR(t), and estimate them simultaneously. In the remain-
ing of this paper, we shall refer to h˙RIR(t) as environmental
signature, as hRIR(t) is predominant. Since the environment
signature uniquely specifies the acoustic recording system, it
can be used to authenticate the integrity of captured audio.
The blind estimation algorithm of environment signature in
the existing literature will be elaborated in Section III-B, and
our proposed authentication and detection algorithm will be
introduce in Section IV.
B. Environmental Signature Estimation
Blind dereverberation is a process of separating reverberant
and dry signals from a single channel audio recording without
exploiting the knowledge of h˙RIR(t). Dereverberation meth-
ods can be divided into the following categories: (i) frequency
domain methods [44]–[47], (ii) time domain methods [48],
[49], (iii) joint time-frequency domain methods [50]. Blind
dereverberation has found a wide range of applications ranging
from speech enhancement [45], [46] to distant speech recog-
nition [47], acoustic environment identification [1]–[4], audio
forensics [2], [51], etc. In our previous works [1]–[4], it was
also experimentally verified that reverberation is quite effective
for environment identification [1], [3], [4] and audio forensics
[2], [51] applications. In this paper, we shall use the frequency
domain method to estimate the RIR. Specifically, we first
introduce the environment signature which presents the log-
spectrum magnitude of RIR contaminated by ambient noise,
and then, elaborate on the corresponding estimation algorithm
[44]. It can be archived by three steps approach as follows.
Step 1: Signature Expression
The Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT) representation of
(1) can be expressed as:
Y (k, l) = S(k, l)×H(k, l) + V (k, l) (2)
where Y (k, l), S(k, l), H(k, l) and V (k, l) are the STFT
coefficients (in the kth frequency bin and the lth frame) of
y(t), s(t), h˙RIR(t) and η(t), respectively. It is important to
mention that (2) is valid if and only if the frame length of the
STFT is larger than the duration of RIR, hRIR(t). Generally,
acoustic channel varies much more slowly than the speech
and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that |H(k, l)| does
not vary significantly with l. Power spectrum of the noisy
observation y(t) is expressed as
|Y (k, l)|2 = |S(k, l)|2 × |H(k, l)|2 + |V (k, l)|2+
2× |S(k, l)| × |H(k, l)| × |V (k, l)| × cos θ
(3)
where θ = ∠S(k, l) + ∠H(k, l) − ∠V (k, l). Dividing both
sides of (3) by |S(k, l)|2 × |H(k, l)|2 and transforming the
resulting expression using logarithm operation results in:
log |Y (k, l)| − log |S(k, l)| = log |H(k, l)|+ log ε(k, l) (4)
where
ε =
√
(ξ−1 + 2ξ−0.5 cos θ + 1) , (5)
and
ξ =
|S(k, l)|2 × |H(k, l)|2
|V (k, l)|2
, (6)
Gaubitch et al. in [44] has shown the way to ex-
tract log |H(k, l)| and log ε(k, l) from the noisy observation
|Y (k, l)|. However, in the application of audio forensics,
the background noise provides useful information and its
effectiveness has been experimentally verified in [4], [51] and
[1]. Thus, we define the environmental signature H as follows
H(k) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
(log |Y (k, l)| − log |S(k, l)|) (7)
Note that in the definition of environmental signature (7),
Y (k, l) is the spectrum of the observation audio signal, and
S(k, l) is the spectrum of the clean audio signal, which can
be estimated as follows.
Step 2: Clean Log-Spectrum Estimation
In practice, S(k, l) is not available and can be approximated
via the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [52]. Given a data set
consisting of clean speeches with various speakers and con-
tents, each sample, s(n), is divided into overlapping windowed
frames and proceeded by the STFT to obtain S(k, l). Mean
substraction is used to smooth the log-spectrum S(k, l),
Slog(k, l) = log |S(k, l)| −
1
K
K∑
k=1
log |S(k, l)| (8)
where K is the total number of frequency bins and Slog(k, l)
represents the smoothed log-spectrum.
For each frame, the RASTA filtered Mel-Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCC) [53] (more robust than pure MFCC)
are estimated, which results in an N -dimensional feature
vector mfccs(l) = [mfccs(1, l), . . . ,mfccs(N, l)]T , where
l denotes the lth audio frame. The target M -mixture GMM
defined by a mean vector, µm, diagonal covariances matrix,
Σm, and weights vector, pim, of each mixture, is trained by
using the MFCCs. The mixture probabilities are expressed as,
γl,m =
pimN (mfccs(l)|µm,Σm)∑M
i=1 piiN (mfccs(l)|µi,Σi)
(9)
where N (mfccs(l)|µm,Σm) represents the multivariate
Gaussian distribution.
4The log-spectrum of clean speech can be obtained by
weighted averaging over all frames as:
S¯log(k) =
∑L
l=1 γl,m × Slog(k, l)∑L
l=1 γl,m
(10)
Step 3: Signature Estimation
Then, the clean speech model of (10) is now used to
estimate the acoustic distortion in (7). More specifically,
the following steps are involved in estimating acoustic dis-
tortion given in (7): (i) a feature vector, mfccy(l) =
[mfccy(1, l), . . . ,mfccy(N, l)]
T
, of observation y(t) is ob-
tained by applying RASTA filtering on estimate MFCC feature
vector, (ii) the posterior probability of mfccy(l) is calculated
by substituting filtered feature vector into (9), which results in
γ¯l,m for each mixture m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . With the availability
of posterior probability, spectrum of the direct signal of the
lth frame can be expressed as:
Sˆ(k, l) = exp
[
M∑
m=1
γ¯l,m × S¯log(k)
]
(11)
Substituting (11) into (7), the estimted signature can be
expressed as:
Hˆ(k) =
1
L
L∑
i=1
[
log |Y (k, l)| − log
(∣∣∣e∑Mm=1 γ¯l,m×S¯log(k)∣∣∣)]
(12)
As a remark note that the accuracy of the estimated RIR
depends on the error between estimated spectrum, Ŝ(k, l), and
the true spectrum, S(k, l).
IV. APPLICATIONS TO AUDIO FORENSICS
A novel audio forensics framework based on the acoustic
impulse response is proposed in this section. Specifically,
we consider two application scenarios of audio forensics: (i)
audio source authentication which determines whether the
query audio/speech is captured in a specific environment or
location as claimed; and (ii) splicing detection which deter-
mines whether the query audio/speech is original or assembled
using multiple samples recorded in different environments and
detects splicing locations (in case of forged audio).
A. Audio Source Authentication
In practice, the crime scene is usually secured and kept
intact for possible further investigation. Thus, it is possible to
rebuild the acoustic environmental setting, including the loca-
tion of microphone and sound source, furniture arrangement,
etc. Hence, it is assumed that the forensic expert can capture
reference acoustic environment signature, denoted as Hˆr, and
compare it to the signature Hˆq extracted from the query audio
recording. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the proposed authentication
scheme is elaborated below:
1) Estimate the RIRs, Hˆq and Hˆr, from the query audio
and reference audio according to the method described
in Section III-B, respectively,
2) Calculate the normalized cross-correlation coefficient ρ
between Hˆq and Hˆr according to (13),
ρ = NCC(Hˆq, Hˆr)
=
K∑
k=1
(Hˆq(k)− µq)(Hˆr(k)− µr)√
K∑
k=1
(Hˆq(k)− µq)
2
√
K∑
k=1
(Hˆr(k)− µr)
2
(13)
where µq = 1K
∑K
k=1 Hˆq(k), µr =
1
K
∑K
k=1 Hˆr(k).
3) Compare the cross-correlation coefficient with an thresh-
old T to determine the authentication of the query
audio. Specifically, the following hypothesis testing rule
is used,
ρ < T : Forged
ρ ≥ T : As Claimed
(14)
Query Audio
Environment
Signature Extraction
Recaptured
Audio
Environment
Signature Extraction
Similarity
Calculation
>T
Forgied
As Claimed
YES
NO
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed audio source authentication method.
The performance of the above authentication scheme de-
pends on the threshold T . In the following part, an criteria is
proposed to derive the optimal threshold.
1) Formulation of Optimal Threshold: Supposing that fe(ρ)
represents the distribution of ρ, which is the correlation
coefficient between the reference audio and the query audio
captured in identical environment. In this case, Hˆq and Hˆr
are highly positive correlated. Similarly, fg(ρ) represents the
distribution of ρ, which is the correlation coefficient between
the reference audio and the query audio captured in different
environments. In this case, Hˆq and Hˆr are expected to be
independent. Due to the inaccurate estimation of signatures
and the potential noise, the resulted correlation coefficients
will diverge from the true values. The statistical distributions
of ρis will be used to determine the optimal threshold. The
binary hypothesis testing based on an optimal threshold, T in
(14), contributes to the following two types of errors:
• Type I Error: Labeling an authentic audio as forged. The
probability of Type I Error is called False Positive Rate
(FPR), which is defined as,
FPR(T ) =
∫ T
−∞
fe(ρ)dx
= 1−Fe(T ) (15)
where, Fe is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of fe.
5• Type II Error: Labeling a forged audio as authentic. The
probability of Type II Error is called False Negative Rate
(FNR), which is defined as,
FNR(T ) =
∫
∞
T
fg(ρ)dx
= 1−Fg(T ) (16)
where, Fg is the (CDF) of fg .
Then, the optimal decision boundary T can be determined
by minimizing the combined effect of these errors as follows,
T := arg min
T∈[−1,1]
[λ× FPR(T ) + (1 − λ)× FNR(T )] (17)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the control factor chosen by the forensic
expert according to the practical applications. In the following
section, we are trying to fit ρ using statistical models.
Deriving the optimal threshold in (17) requires the prior
knowledge of fe(ρ) and fg(ρ). One intuitive solution is using
the empirical distributions (histograms) of ρ. However, this
strategy results in high computing complexity of determining
the optimal threshold in (17). The anther disadvantage is
that the closed-form of the threshold can not be determined
according to specified FPR or FNR. In the next section, we
fit the distributions using statistical models and elaborate the
estimation of the model parameters, which can be used to
calculate the threshold.
2) Distribution Modeling and Parameters Estimation: To
model distribution of ρ, we consider the same acoustic envi-
ronment case first. That is, for identical acoustic environments,
correlation coefficient, ρ, is very close to the extreme value
(maximum value) of interval [−1, 1], e.g. ρ → 1. We exper-
imentally find that the extreme value distribution is a good
model in this case due to its simplification and low fitting er-
ror(shown in Fig. 3 and SectionV-B1). The Probability Density
Function (PDF) of extreme value distribution is expressed as
[54],
fe(ρ|µe, δe) = δ
−1
e exp
[
ρ− µe
δe
− exp
(
ρ− µe
δe
)]
(18)
where µe and δe represent the location and scale parameter,
respectively. The parameters, µe and δe, can be estimated
via maximum likelihood estimation [55]. The likelihood of
drawing N samples ρi from an extreme value distribution with
parameters µe and δe can be expressed as,
P (ρ1, . . . , ρN |µe, δe) =
N∏
i=1
δ−1e exp
[
ρ
i
− exp
(
ρ
i
)]
(19)
and
ρ
i
=
ρi − µe
δe
(20)
The maximum likelihood estimation of µˆe and δˆe can be
expressed as follows,
µˆe = δe log
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
exp
(
ρiδˆ
−1
e
)]
(21)
− δˆe −
1
N
N∑
i=1
ρi +
∑N
i=1 ρi exp
[
ρiδˆ
−1
e
]
∑N
i=1 exp
[
ρiδˆ
−1
e
] = 0 (22)
Numerical methods such as gradient descent can be used to
solve (22). Fig. 3 shows the plots of the true distributions of ρ,
for the case of that the query audio and the recaptured audio
are in the same environment, and the extreme value distribu-
tion with estimated parameters µˆe = 0.72 and δˆe = 0.11. It
can be observed from Fig. 3 that, the estimated distribution is
skewed left, and therefore, the extreme value distribution can
model the true distribution reasonably well.
−0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
ρ
De
ns
ity
 
 
True Distribution
Modeled Extreme Value Distribution
Fig. 3. Plots of the true distribution of ρ and the extreme value distribution
with estimated parameters µˆe = 0.72 and δˆe = 0.11.
Similarly, correlation coefficient ρ between Hˆq(k) and
Hˆr(k) estimated from the query audio and the recaptured
audio which were made in two different environments is
expected to be close to zero. In this case, correlation coefficient
ρ is expected to obey a heavy-tailed distribution. To this
end, the distribution of ρ(i), i = 1, . . . ,M is modeled using
the Generalized Gaussian [56] distribution. Motivation behind
considering the generalized Gaussian model here is due to
the fact that thicker tails will lead to more conservative error
estimates, as demonstrated in Fig. 4. The PDF of Generalized
Gaussian distribution is given as follows,
fg(ρ|αg, βg, µg) =
1
2αgΓ(1/βg)
exp
[
−
(
|ρ− µg|
αg
)βg]
(23)
where αg, βg , and µg represent the scale, shape and mean
parameters, respectively.
The parameters can be estimated using the method of
moments [56] as follows,
µˆg =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ρi (24)
βˆg = G
−1(mˆ21/mˆ2) (25)
αˆg = mˆ1
Γ(1/βˆg)
Γ(2/βˆg)
(26)
6and
mˆ1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|ρi − µˆg| (27)
mˆ2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|ρi − µˆg|
2 (28)
G(x) =
[Γ(2/x)]
2
Γ(1/x)Γ(3/x)
(29)
where Γ(x) is the Gamma function.
Fig. 4 shows the plot of the distribution of normalized
correlation coefficients between Hˆq(k) and Hˆr(k), which are
estimated from audio samples captured in different environ-
ments. It can be observed from Fig. 4 that the distribution
of ρ fits reasonably well into the generalized Gaussian PDF.
The goodness of fit is evaluated based on the Kullback-Leibler
divergence (KLD). The KLD between the true distribution and
generalized Gaussian fitted distribution is equal to 0.24 which
indicates that the assumed generalized Gaussian distribution
fits reasonably well with the assumed model. It can be
observed from Figs. 3 and 4 that both distributions are heavy-
tailed and therefore will overlap.
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Fig. 4. Plot of the true distribution of ρ and generalized Gaussian distribution
with estimated parameters µˆg = 0.077, αˆg = 0.14 and βˆg = 1.74.
In some practical applications, the threshold should be
selected to satisfy the maximum allowed FPR (τ ) requirement.
The optimal threshold regarding to the specific FPR τ can be
obtained via
T = F−1e (1 − τ) (30)
where F−1e represents the inverse function of Fe. Subse-
quently, substituting (30) into (16) results in the FNR as
follows
FNRT = 1−Fg(F
−1
e (1− τ)) (31)
With these fitted statistical model (18), (30) can be deduced
to
Tmodel = δˆe ln
[
ln
(
1
1− τ
)]
+ µˆe (32)
B. Audio Splicing Detection and Localization
In this section, we will extend the method proposed in
Section IV-A to audio splicing detection. To illustrate au-
dio splicing process, an audio clip is assembled from three
segments, Seg1, Seg2, and Seg3 consisting of M1, M2,
and M3 frames, respectively. Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that audio segments Seg1 and Seg3 are recorded in
acoustic environment A and audio segment Seg2 is recorded
in environment B. Fig.5 illustrates the temporal plot of the
resulting audio. It can be observed from Fig. 5 that splicing
does not introduce any visual artifacts in the resulting audio.
Seg1
M1 frames
Seg3
M3 frames
Seg2
M2 frames
Fig. 5. Plot of the spliced audio obtained assembled from three segments,
Seg1, Seg2, and Seg3 consisting of M1, M2, and M3 frames, respectively.
Here, audio segments Seg1 and Seg3 are recorded in acoustic environment
A and audio segment Seg2 is recorded in environment B.
The difference between splicing detection and source au-
thentication is that the reference audio is usually not available.
Hence, in our proposed scheme, we shall use the RIRs
extracted from the previous frames as reference, and compare
it with the coming frames. Specifically, the proposed scheme
can be divided into two phase: raw detection and refinement.
The procedure of raw detection is elaborated below:
1) Divide the query audio in to overlapped frames and
estimate the RIR, Hˆ
i
q , from the ith frame according to
the method in Section III-B,
2) Calculate the cross-correlation coefficient between the
RIRs of the ith frame and the previous frames according
to (33),
ρ˙i =

1
i
i∑
j=1
NCC(Hˆ
(j)
q , Hˆ
(i)
q ), if ρ˙i−1 > T, i ≤MT
1
MT
MT∑
j=1
NCC(Hˆ
(j)
q , Hˆ
(i)
q ), otherwise
(33)
MT = min
i∈[1,M ]
{i | ρ˙i < T } and ρ˙1 = 1 (34)
where Hˆ
(i)
q is the estimated channel response of the ith
frame from the query audio. The term M is the length
of query audio. MT is the rough estimation of M1. Figs.
6 (a) and (b) show the correlation calculation methods
expressed in (33) for i ≤MT and i > MT , respectively.
3) Identify the spliced frame of the query audio according
to (35)
ρ˙i < T : Spliced Audio Frame
ρ˙i ≥ T : Original Audio Frame
(35)
It should be noted that this framework for localizing forgery
locations in audio requires an accurate estimate of the impulse
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Fig. 6. An flow chart of correlation calculation proposed for audio splicing
detection.
⊗
and
⊕
represents the correlation calculation operator and
arithmetical average operator, respectively.
response, Hˆq(k). Any distortions in Hˆq(k), will result in a
number of false alarms. However, due to the lack of substan-
tial reference frames, the average-based smoothing technique
(33) is adopted to reduce the detection errors. Eq. (33) first
calculates the cross-correlation coefficient between Hˆ
(1)
q and
Hˆ
(2)
q . If ρ˙2 > T , the second frame is authentic (come from
the same location with the first frame). Then, it calculates the
cross-correlation coefficients between Hˆ
(1)
q and Hˆ
(3)
q , Hˆ
(2)
q
and Hˆ
(3)
q , updates the coefficients according to the smoothing
method in (33) and moves forward to the next frame, and
so on. The average-based smoothing technique used in (33)
results in a stable estimation of RIRs, which will reduce the
decision error of (35).
Our experimental results show that the detection perfor-
mance can be further improved by exploiting the correlation
between adjacent frames. The motivation behind this is that
tampering usually occurs in many consecutive frames instead
of a few scattered frames. That means if neighborhoods of the
current frame are forged, the current frame has a significatively
high probability of being labeled as forged also. Based on this
reasonable assumption, local correlation between the estimated
signatures extracted from adjacent frames is used to make the
forgery localization approach robust to estimation errors. The
refinement procedure is summarized as follows:
1) Detect the suspected frame using the raw detection
method and set the label pk of the ith frame to 1 as
follows,
pk = 1, if ρ˙i < T (36)
2) Refine the results using neighborhood similarity score
as follows,
qk = 1, if
∑k=i+W/2
k=i−W/2 pk − pi
W
> Rs (37)
where, W and Rs represent the window size (e.g.,
W=3 or 5) and similarity score threshold (e.g., Rs ∈
[0.7, 0.9]), respectively. qk = 1 indicates that the kth
frame is detected as spliced.
Eq.(37) means that, for the ith suspected frame, if the
ratio of its adjacent frames being suspected exceeds Rs, the
ith frame will be labeled as spliced. It have been observed
through experimentation that the refined algorithm signifi-
cantly reduces the false alarm rates and improves detection
performance. Section V provides performance analysis of the
proposed method on both synthetic and real-world recordings.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is evaluated
using two data sets: synthetic data and real world human
speech. Details for the data sets used, the experimental setup
and the experimental results are provided below.
A. Data Set and Experimental Setting
Firstly, the speech data of TIMIT corpus [57] was used to
train the clean log-spectrum and generate the synthetic data.
TIMIT consists of 6300 sentences: ten sentences spoken by
each of 438 male and 192 female speakers. The data set
is divided into a training set (462 speakers) and a test set
(168 speakers) with entirely different sentence contents apart
from the dialect diagnostics. Each utterance is approximately
3 seconds long with sampling frequency fs = 16 kHz. For
training, the entire training set was processed using Hanning
windowed frames (128ms for each) with overlapping rate
of 50%. 12 RASTA-MFCCs of each frame was calculated
and used to train the GMM with 512 mixtures. For test, the
ten sentences of each speaker in the test set were concate-
nated to form one utterance with an approximate duration
of 30s. Synthetic room response generated by source-image
method [58] for a rectangular room is convolved with the test
speech. Each time, all the parameters used for room response
simulation were randomly selected to generate the RIRs of
different environments. Table I shows the candidate interval
of parameters used.
For the second data set, real world data consisting of
60 speech recordings were used (the same data set used in
[39]). The speeches were recorded in four different environ-
ments: (1) outdoor; (2) small office (3.4 m×3.8 m×2.7 m,
predominantly furnished with carpet and drywalls); (3) stairs
(predominantly ceramic tiles and concrete walls); (4) restroom
(5.2 m×4.3 m×2.7 m, predominantly furnished with ceramic
tiles). In each recording environment, each of the three speak-
ers (one male S1, two females S2 and S3) read five different
texts. The audio samples were captured by a commercial-grade
external microphone mounted on a laptop computer using
Audacity 2.0 software. The audio was originally recorded with
44.1 kHz sampling frequency, 16 bits/sample resolution, and
then downsampled to 16 kHz. The real world data set will be
used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
8TABLE I
THE CANDIDATE RANGE OF EACH PARAMETER USED FOR ROOM IMPULSE
RESPONSE SIMULATION
Parameter Interval Parameter Interval
Room Height
rz
[2.5, 3.5]
Mic Position
mx
[0.5, rx − 0.5]
Room Width
rx
[2.5, 5]
Mic Position
my
[0.5, ry − 0.5]
Room Length
ry
[rx, 10]
Sound Position
sz
[0.4, rz − 0.8]
T60 [0.1, 0.7]
Sound Position
sx
[0.3, rx − 0.9]
Mic Position
mz
[0.5, 1.0]
Sound Position
sy
[0.3, ry − 0.9]
B. Experimental Results
1) Results on Synthetic Data: In this section, synthetically
generated reverberant data were used to verify the effective-
ness of the proposed algorithm. First, randomly selected pa-
rameters from Table I were used to generate two different RIRs
HA and HB , which characterize two different environments A
and B. Both of them were convoluted with randomly selected
speeches from the test set. Shown in Fig. 7 are the magnitude
plots of the estimated HˆA and HˆB . It can be observed that
from Fig. 7 that the RIRs (HˆA1 and HˆA2) estimated from
the speeches in environment A are quite similar, and different
from HˆB , estimated from the speeches in environment B. The
normalized correlation coefficient between HˆA1 and HˆA2 is
equal to 0.81, which is significantly higher than that between
HˆA1 and HˆB (0.001). Similar results can be obtained from
other tests. More results can be found in [44].
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Fig. 7. Magnitude (dB) plots of estimated Hˆ from two different environ-
ments: (a) Estimated HˆA1 from randomly tested speech 1; (b) Estimated HˆA2
from randomly tested speech 2, which is different from speech 1; (c) Estimated
HˆB from randomly tested speech 3, which is different from speeches 1 and
2.
The optimal threshold T can be determined from the
synthetic data as follows. The randomly generated RIRs HA
and HB were convolved with the test data set, respectively,
resulting in two simulated synthetic data sets from two virtual
environments A and B. Then, the environmental signatures
estimated from the synthetic speeches in environments A and
B are represented as HˆA,i and HˆB,i, respectively, where
0 < i ≤ Nt, Nt denotes total number of testing speeches.
The distributions of intra-environment correlation coefficient,
ρA,i→A,j = NCC(HˆA,i, HˆA,j), i 6= j and inter-environment
correlation coefficient ρA,i→B,k = NCC(HˆA,i, HˆB,k), are
shown in Fig. 8. As discussed in Section IV-A, ρA,i→A,j and
ρA,i→B,k can be modeled as the extreme value distribution
and the generalized Gaussian distribution, respectively. The
optimal threshold T for these distributions is determined as
0.3274 by setting λ = 0.5, which results in the minimal overall
error of 2.23%. It is important to mention that depending
on the application at hand, λ and the corresponding optimal
decision threshold, T , can be selected.
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Fig. 8. The true and the fitted distributions of ρA,i→A,j and ρA,i→B,k
and the optimal decision threshold, T = 0.3274
We have also evaluated performance of the proposed method
in terms of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC). Fig.
9 shows the ROC curve of True Positive Rate (TPR, which
represents the probability that query audio is classified as
forged, when in fact it is) vs False Positive Rate (FPR, which
represents the probability that query audio is labeled as forged,
when in fact it is not) on the test audio set. It can be observed
from Fig. 9 that, for FPR > 3%, TPR→ 1. It indicates that
the proposed audio source authentication scheme has almost
perfect detection performance when the recaptured reference
audios are available. In addition, the forensic analyst can
recapture sufficient reference audio samples, which leads to
more accurate and stable estimation of environment signature
hence better detection performance.
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Fig. 9. ROC curve of the proposed audio source authentication scheme.
9Furthermore, we also evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed splicing detection algorithm for synthetic data. Two
randomly selected speeches from the test set were convolved
with HA and HB , resulting in two reverberant speeches RSA
and RSB . And RSB was inserted into a random location
within RSA. Fig. 10(a) shows the plot (in time domain) of
the resulting audio. It is barely possible to observe the trace
of splicing by visual inspection, even for forensic experts. Fig.
10(b) shows the detection output of the proposed algorithm
listed in Algorithm ?? with a frame size of 3s. It can be
observed from Fig. 10 that the proposed forgery detection and
localization algorithm has successfully detected and localized
the inserted audio segment, RSB with 100% accuracy.
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Fig. 10. Forgery detection and localization results (with frame size = 3s).
The impact of frame size on performance of the proposed
scheme is investigated next. Fig. 11 shows the detection
performance of the proposed forgery detection and localization
algorithm as a function of the frame size (used to estimate
the environmental signature Hˆ). It is intuitive that a larger
frame size would result in more accurate estimate of Hˆ,
hence higher detection accuracy. Forgery localization, on the
other hand, has the localization granularity (≈ half of frame
size) and thus requires a smaller frame size. In other words,
decreasing frame size leads to a better localization resolution,
but less accurate estimate of environment signature, which may
reduce detection accuracy. It can be observed from Fig. 11
that for frame size > 1, the splicing parts can be identified
and localized with 100% accuracy. Subsequently, for frame
sizes between 500 ms and 1 s, the proposed scheme can still
detect the splicing segments for carefully chosen threshold,
instead of the trained “Optimal Threshold” in Section IV-A.
For instance, in Fig. 11(e), we can still obtain good detection
and localization performance if the threshold is equal to
0.17. Reducing the frame size further deteriorates both the
performance of detection accuracy and localization granularity
(see also Fig. 11(f)). It has been observed through extensive
experimentation that for the data sets used here the frame size
of 1s may be a good compromise and the optimal frame size
should be determined according to the application at hand.
The effect of noise on the proposed scheme has also been
investigated. To this end, two randomly generated RIRs HA
and HB were convolved with two randomly selected speeches
from the test data set, resulting in reverberant speeches RSA
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Fig. 11. Detecting performance of the proposed scheme with various frame
sizes: (a)3s, (b)2s, (c)1s, (d)750ms, (e)500ms, (f)400ms, Red line represents
the threshold T = 0.3274 used to classify the suspected forged frame
and RSB , respectively. Noisy speech samples were generated
by adding white Gaussian noise with various Signal-to-Noise
Ratios (SNRs) to RSA and RSB , and noisy forged recordings
were generated by inserting RSB in the middle of RSA. A
total of 1344 noisy spliced audio recordings were obtained
by varying SNR values. Fig. 12 shows the detection results
of our proposed scheme under various SNR values. For each
forged sample, roughly, the 13th through 44th frames belong
to RSB , others come from RSA. SNRA and SNRB represent
the SNRs of reverberant speeches RSA and RSB , respectively.
It can be observed from Fig. 12(a)-(f), if the SNR of either
speech recording (say RSA) is kept relatively high, then the
proposed scheme can detect and localize the inserted frames
with very high accuracy, regardless of the SNR of another
speech (RSB). As acoustic environment signature is generally
modeled as a combination of the RIR and the background
noise, the divergence of background noise is also a trace of
counterfeit [43], [51]. It has been observed that by decreasing
the SNR level, detection performance of the proposed scheme
deteriorates. It can also be observed from Fig. 12(g)-(h)
that the FPR performance of the proposed scheme increases
gradually as SNR decreases. However, even under low SNR
conditions (e.g., 10dB), the proposed scheme exhibits good
detection and localization performance.
2) Results on Real World Data: Effectiveness of the pro-
posed audio splicing detection method has also been verified
on real-world speech data. To achieve this goal, a data set
consisting of 60 real world speech recordings of three speakers
reading five different texts made in four acoustically different
environments is used. In addition, the audio recordings made
in the same environment with the same speaker (different
text contents) is downsampled to 16 kHz and concatenated
to generate each audio recording of 90s to 120s duration. For
faircomparison, each forged audio is created by inserting audio
segment (from other recording) into the middle of another
recording.
Fig. 13 shows the detection results of the proposed scheme
on real world recordings created by inserting speech recording
of the 1st speaker in the 1st environment (red part in Fig.
13(a)) in the middle of speech recording of the 2nd speaker
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Fig. 12. Detecting performance of the proposed scheme under with various
SNRs. The frame size is 3s for all runs. Blue circles and red triangles
represent the frames from RSA and RSB , respectively. The red lines are
the corresponding “optimal” decision thresholds.
in the 3rd environment [blue part in Fig. 13(a)]. It can be
observed from Fig. 13(a) that all three segments contain strong
but similar background noise and splicing did not introduce
any visual artifacts. The resulting audio is analyzed using the
proposed splicing detection and localization method. For frame
size ≥ 1s, the optimal decision threshold was set to be 0.4,
i.e., T = 0.4. It has been observed however that detection
performance gradually deteriorates [e.g., both the FPR and
FNR (the probability of query audio is labeled as authentic
when in fact it is forged.) increases] for smaller frame sizes.
This fact is illustrated in Fig. 13(c)&(d). It can be observed
that the proposed scheme is still capable of detecting/localizing
the inserted frames for frame sizes 2s and 1s. However,
optimal decision threshold selection becomes very difficult for
smaller framework size. Pattern recognition methods such as
support vector machine [59] may be applied to address these
limitations. Nevertheless, discussion on this is not the focus
of this paper.
It has also been observed through experimentation that some
of the recordings in the data set contain stronger background
noise than the signal shown in Fig. 13(a), which deteriorates
the accuracy of environment signature estimation, and hence
degrades the performance of our proposed scheme. The noise
effect can be reduced by using long-term average but at the
cost of localization resolution. Experimental results indicate
that frame sizes between 2s and 3s resulted in good detection
performance for median noise level, and for strong background
noise, frame sizes over 5s may be needed for acceptable
performance. Similar results were obtained for other forged
recordings.
In our next experiment, the detection accuracy of the
proposed scheme for the real-world data set is evaluated.
For this experiment, spliced audio is generated from two
randomly selected audio recordings of different speakers made
in different environments from the real-world data set. Two
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Fig. 13. Detecting performance of the proposed scheme on real-world data
with various frame sizes: (b)3s, (c)2s, and (d):1s. Blue circles and red triangles
represent the frames from E1S1 and E3S2, respectively
quantitative measures, TPR and FPR, are used to evaluate
the frame-level detection performance. To achieve a smooth
ROC plot, the TPR/FPR pair is computed by averaging over
50 runs of different frame sizes. Fig. 14 shows the resulting
ROC curves computed at different frame sizes. It can be
observed from Fig. 14 that the overall detection accuracy
improves for larger frame sizes. This is expected as larger
frame sizes result in more accurate and stable estimation of
environment signature. In addition, it can also be observed
from Fig. 9 and Fig. 14 that, the detection performance of
the proposed scheme deteriorates in the presence of ambient
noise. Detection performance in the presence of ambient noise
can be improved by using larger frame sizes but at the cost of
lower forgery localization accuracy.
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Fig. 14. ROC curves of the proposed scheme on real-world data with various
frame sizes.
3) Robustness to MP3 Compression: In this experiment,
we tested the robustness of our scheme against MP3 compres-
sion attacks. To this end, audio recordings were compressed
into MP3 format using FFMPEG [60] with bitrates R ∈
11
{16, 32, 64, 96, 128, 192, 256} kbps. Spliced audio recordings
were generated by randomly selecting compressed audio
recordings captured in different environments. It is important
to mention that each audio segment used to generate forged
audio was compressed to MP3 format with the same set of
parameters, e.g., the same bit-rate, etc.
For forgery detection, MP3 compressed forged audio is
decoded to the wav format, which is then analyzed using the
proposed method. Each experiment was repeated 50 times and
detection performance was averaged over 50 runs to reduce
the effect of noise. Table II shows the detection accuracy (the
probability of correctly identifying the inserted and original
frames) of the proposed scheme under MP3 attacks for various
bit-rates and frame sizes.
TABLE II
DETECTION ACCURACIES OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME UNDER MP3
ATTACKS WITH VARIOUS BIT-RATES AND DIFFERENT FRAME SIZES
Frame MP3 Compression Bit Rate (bps)
Size 16k 32k 64k 96k 128k 192k 256k
4s 0.86 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94
3s 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94
2s 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93
1s 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.84
The following observations can be made from Table II.
Firstly, the detection performance improves for higher bit-
rates, which introduce less distortion. The detection accuracy
keeps relatively unchanged (less than 1% loss) for bit-rates
R ≥ 32 kbps. This indicates that the proposed scheme is robust
to MP3 compression attack with bit-rate R > 16 kbps.
Secondly, the detection performance deteriorates (on aver-
age 7.6%) by changing the frame size from 2s to 1s. It has
been verified in our previous experiments that smaller frame
sizes result in relatively less accurate estimate of environment
signature.
Finally, it can be observed that frame sizes less than 3s result
in relatively unstable detection performance, which can be at-
tributed to the random noise. In addition, for MP3 compression
attack, the detection performance of the proposed scheme is
relatively more sensitive to frame size. As the performance
of forgery localization method depends on frame size used
for analysis, forensic analyst can select an appropriate frame
size for the application and test audio at hand. It has been
observed that for the data set used, frame size > 2s results
in good compromise between the detection and localization
accuracies.
4) Comparison Results with Previous Works: In our last
set of experiments, performance of the proposed framework
is compared to the existing splicing detection scheme [43],
which uses inconsistency in local noise levels estimated from
the query audio for splicing detection.
To this end, forged (or spliced) audio recording is gen-
erated by splicing audio recordings made in two different
environments. More specifically, speech recording of the 3rd
speaker made in the 3rd environment (E3S3) is inserted in
the middle of speech recording of the 1st speaker made in
the 1st environment (E1S1). Fig. 15(a) presents the time-
domain plot of the spliced audio assembled from E1S1 (blue)
and E3S3 (red). It can be observed from Fig.15(a) that both
original recordings, e.g., E1S1 and E3S3, contain the same
background noise level. Fig. 15(b) and Fig. 15(c) show the
frame-level detection performance of the proposed scheme
and Pan’s scheme [43], respectively. It can be observed from
Fig. 15(b)&(c) that the proposed scheme is capable of not
only detecting the presence of the inserted frames but also
localizing these frames. On the other hand, Pan’s scheme
is unable to detect or localize the inserted frames. Inferior
performance of Pan’s scheme can be attributed to the fact that
it only depends on the local noise level for forgery detection,
which is almost the same in the forged audio used for analysis.
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Fig. 15. Detection performance of the proposed scheme and Pan’s scheme
[43]. For fair comparison, frame size is set to 2s for both experiments. Red
triangles represent the frames of recording of the 3rd speaker in the 3rd
environment (E3S3) and blue circles represent frames of recording of the 1st
speaker in the 1st environment (E1S1).
To further demonstrate the superiority of our proposed
scheme, a forged audio is generated by splicing together two
speech recordings with different levels of background noise.
More specifically, the speech recording of the 3rd speaker
made in the 2nd environment (E2S3) is inserted at the middle
of speech recording of the 2nd speaker made in the 1st
environment (E1S2). Fig. 16(a) shows the time-domain plot
of the forged audio assembled from E1S2 (blue) and E2S3
(red). It can be observed that the segment from E2S3 exhibits
higher noise level than the segments from E1S2. The resulting
forged recording is analyzed using both the proposed scheme
and Pan’s scheme [43]. Fig. 16(b) and Fig. 16(c) illustrate the
the plots of frame-level detection performance of these two
schemes, respectively. It can be observed from Fig. 16(b) that
the proposed scheme has successfully detected and localized
the inserted frames with much higher accuracy than the result
in [43]. In addition, it can be observed from Fig. 16(c) that
Pan’s scheme is unable to localize the inserted frames. Further
more, Pan’s scheme achieves a detection accuracy close to
0.6, which is far lower than the accuracy achieved by the
proposed scheme, 0.93. Finally, the detection performance of
both schemes are also evaluated for larger frame sizes. As
expected performance of the proposed improved significantly
12
for frame size > 2s. However, no significant improvement is
observed for Pan’s scheme.
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Fig. 16. Detection performance of the proposed scheme and Pan’s scheme
[43]. For fair comparison, the frame size is set to 2s for both experiments.
Red triangles represent the frames of recording of the 3rd speaker in the 2nd
environment (E2S3) and blue circles represent the frames of recording of the
2nd speaker in the 1st environment (E1S1).
In our final experiment, the performance of the proposed
scheme and Pan’s scheme [43] is evaluated on forged audio
clips. Forged audio clips were generated by randomly selecting
audio clips (of approximately 3s duration) from TIMIT and
modifying each of them by adding white Gaussian noise
(SNR ∈ {15dB, 20dB, 25dB, 30dB}) into the first 50% of the
frames (Other frames are kept to be clean.). It can be observed
that Pan’s scheme performs reasonably well for this forged
data set. However, when this experiment is repeated for audio
clips of 30 second duration, FPRs, for Pan’s scheme increase
significantly. This experiment implies that generalization of
Pan’s scheme [43] requires further verification.
Performance comparison of the proposed scheme to Pan’s
scheme [43] can be summarized as follows: (i) superior
performance of the proposed scheme can be attributed to RIR
which is an acoustic environment related signature and is more
reliable than the ambient noise level alone; (ii) the proposed
scheme models acoustic environment signature by considering
both the background noise (including the level, type, spectrum,
etc.) and the RIR (see (7)); and (iii) the proposed scheme relies
on the acoustic channel impulse response, which is relatively
hard to manipulate as compare to the background noise based
acoustic signature.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel method for audio splicing detec-
tion and localization has been proposed. The magnitude of
acoustic channel impulse response and ambient noise have
been considered to model the intrinsic acoustic environment
signature. The acoustic environment signature is jointly esti-
mated using the spectrum classification technique. Distribution
of the correlation coefficient between the query audio and
the reference audio has been used to determine the opti-
mal decision threshold, which is used for the frame-level
forgery detection. A frame with similarity score less than
the optimal threshold is labeled as spliced and as authentic
otherwise. For splicing localization, a local correlation based
on the relationship between adjacent frames has been adopted
to reduce frame-level detection errors. The performance of
the proposed scheme has been evaluated on two data sets
with numerous experimental settings. Experimental results has
validated the effectiveness of the proposed scheme for both
forgery detection and localization. Robustness of the proposed
scheme to both MP3 compression and additive noise attacks
has also been tested. Performance of the proposed scheme
has also been compared against the state-of-the-art for audio
splicing detection [43]. Performance comparison has indicated
that the proposed scheme outperforms the approach presented
in [43]. The proposed scheme may be a good candidate for
the practical digital audio forensics applications.
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